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ABSTRACT

There was a marked change in policing after the terror attacks on September 11,
2001. While much research has examined this change in other areas of the country, less is
known about how 9/11 impacted policing in Maine. To fill this research gap, the present
study examined police officers’ perceptions of job change since the 9/11 terrorist attack.
Data from semi-structured interviews with ten police officers were analyzed using
focused content coding. The data analysis revealed three general themes that represent
how police officers thought that their jobs had changed: (1) national security, (2) local
policing, and (3) fusion centers. This paper concludes with recommendations for police
and policymakers on the future of local policing.
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INTRODUCTION
There was a scramble in the law enforcement community in the aftermath of the
terror attacks on September 11, 2001. Security and law enforcement agencies were
unsure how to best protect the American people from this new type of terrorism. In
response to this lack of preparedness, policing institutions were forced to reassess their
methods for protecting U.S. citizens (Davis, 2010). For example, counterterrorism units
were developed and deployed in large cities. These units were issued machine guns and
allocated armored vehicles, and they received military training. Some large cities also
partnered with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to create terrorism taskforces
dedicated to those cities (Davis, 2010).
Maine has no cities that are large enough to have experienced these changes;
however, there are more subtle changes that are widespread throughout the country that
are present in Maine. Intelligence-led policing has been one of these changes.
Intelligence-led policing is the idea that police officers know the background and history
of the person that they are interacting with before the officer encounters them (Gonzales,
2005). Another change has been the federal 1033 program, which provides
decommissioned military equipment to local law enforcement agencies. The result of this
program has increased allocations to police forces in the theory of better arming police
officers against the threat of terrorism.
Another shift since 9/11 is that local police have become integral parts of the
national security system (Schafer, 2009). They are responsible for investigating local tips
reported by the public for terrorism credibility and passing on pertinent information to the
FBI. Local police are also essential for protecting critical infrastructure (Schafer, 2009).
1

Given those established changes, this study seeks to understand to what extent local
police in Maine think their job has changed since 9/11, and if the officers think they have
any impact on national security. In the current research 10 police officers in Maine who
were officers on 9/11 were interviewed to determine if and how they thought their jobs
had changed. In the following section I summarize the extant literature on intelligenceled policing and the 1033 program.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
Intelligence-Led Policing
Intelligence-led policing is one of the biggest changes since 9/11. Intelligence-led
policing is the idea that the police officer responding to a call-for-service knows the
record of the person involved and has more information in general before police arrive
(Gonzales, 2005). This policing strategy also involves analyzing all the information that
has been gathered by police through prior contact and given to police by the public and
using this analysis to identify people who are more likely to become repeat offenders
(LeCates, 2018). Because the officer has more information before interacting with the
person, intelligence-led policing is said to be the best way to operate in the 21st century
(Price, 2013).
One of the most integral parts of intelligence-led policing is the fusion center.
Fusion centers are information databases that operate at the state level in conjunction
with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the FBI. Since 9/11, 78 fusion
centers have been established across the United States (Price, 2013). Each fusion center
has its own mission statement and operates by the rules set by the state or municipality
that it operates under. Even with these differences, the basic function of each remains the
same: collect, store, and disseminate information across and between the federal
government and state and local law enforcement agencies (“National Network of Fusion
Center Fact Sheet,” n.d.). Members of the law enforcement community argue fusion
centers promote better preparedness among local law enforcement agencies (Price, 2013).
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The fusion center in Maine is called the Maine Information and Analysis Center
(MIAC) (“Maine Information and Analysis Center,” n.d.). MIAC was established in 2006
by an executive order from then-governor John Baldacci. The mission of MIAC is:
To collect, process, analyze, and appropriately share intelligence between the
federal government and the State of Maine. This shall be accomplished through
the combination of resources from principal agencies, and the establishment of
relationships from all levels of government and the private sector (“Maine
Information and Analysis Center,” n.d.).
There are some issues with the mission statement of MIAC. The mission statement does
not define what “appropriately share” means, giving the officers who have access to the
information a wide amount of leeway with a great deal of sensitive information (Mistler,
2020). The mission statement of MIAC also does not include the word ‘terrorism’ even
though fusion centers were established to help prevent another terrorist attack (Davis,
2010).
MIAC is housed in and funded at the state level through the Maine State Police.
MIAC works with agencies to protect critical infrastructure and prevent terrorism.
Critical infrastructure includes assets essential for the functioning of society and
economy, such as communications, energy, food and agriculture, government facilities,
transportation, and nuclear materials (“Critical Infrastructure Sectors,” n.d.). MIAC also
collects information that police officers use to combat the drug war, such as collecting car
information of people who frequently travel between Maine and cities known to be
sources of illegal drugs (Byrne, 2020).
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MIAC collaborates with local law enforcement and the public to see threats that
law enforcement would ordinally miss. In 2010, DHS rolled out a new program called “If
You See Something, Say Something” (“What is Suspicious Activity,” 2020). This
program relies on the public to inform local law enforcement if they notice anything
suspicious or out of the ordinary. The DHS attempts to make it clear that suspicious
activity is not dependent on a person's religion, race, or ethnicity. Examples of suspicious
activity include unattended backpacks or packages, or someone breaking into a restricted
area (“What is Suspicious Activity,” 2020).
All of these tips are reported and investigated locally. The tips credible for
criminal activity remain at the local level while the tips credible for terrorism are passed
through MIAC to the FBI. MIAC keeps records of all the information that is reported to
them and can give that information to the FBI or local law enforcement agencies as
needed (“Maine Information and Analysis Center,” n.d.).
There has been a great deal of controversy surrounding MIAC. One issue is that
the information that was being stored in MIAC was not secure. In June of 2020, the socalled “Blueleaks” hacks occurred exposing the personal information of thousands of
citizens that the fusion center had information on. All of this information was put on the
internet for anyone to find (Rhoda, 2020).
A second issue surrounding MIAC is the tactics that the center employed. A
former trooper claimed that the fusion center was regularly breaking privacy laws and
tracking people who were not breaking any laws. One alleged example was the fusion
center keeping the personal information of people who were applying for gun licenses,
creating a de facto registry of gun owners, and violating state law (Byrne, 2020).
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A third ongoing complaint lodged against MIAC is that it is no longer focused on
terrorism but instead works with police departments in investigating routine crimes, such
as theft and drug crimes (Byrne, 2020). This activity is not in conflict with the mission
statement of MIAC; however, there are people who believe the fusion center should be
more focused on terrorism than on minor crimes (Mistler, 2015).
MIAC has exhibited a significant amount of “mission creep” or intentional
expansion of responsibilities at the fusion center (McQuade, 2019). MIAC was created
with the intention to focus on terrorism and prevent a terror attack in Maine. The mission
of MIAC has unofficially expanded to combating drug trafficking and monitoring people
participating in protests. MIAC officials have used these new duties to argue that they
should have more money and resources (Byrne, 2020). These new activities are done
outside of the law that established MIAC (McQuade, 2019).
One of the more recent incidents of criticism involved MIAC's tracking of
protesters in the Black Lives Matter movement in the summer of 2020 and the tracking of
protesters of the Central Maine Power Corridor. There were bulletins issued about the
activities of these ‘left-wing’ protests, and police departments were told to be on the
lookout for violent activities from these protesters (Byrne, 2020). MIAC was accused of
racial bias because it did not track any people involved in right-wing protests that
exhibited that potential for more serious crimes because of the weapons possessed by this
group of protesters (Tipping, 2020). The spokesman for MIAC denied that the center had
a racial bias when it analyzed information on protestors and emphasized that MIAC did
not collect the information. MIAC only stored information given to it by other agencies
(Tipping, 2020).
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There has been a general criticism of fusion centers in that they keep more
information about people of color and of religious minorities than they do for white
people. Fusion center officials publicly make it clear that they protect the rights of
minorities. Fusion center officials also claim that they receive more tips from the public
through the “If you See Something, Say Something” program on people of color and
religious minorities which explains the difference in the amount of information. The DHS
makes it very clear that “Factors such as race, ethnicity, and/or religious affiliation are
not suspicious. The public should report all suspicious behavior and situations (e.g., an
unattended backpack or package, or someone breaking into a restricted area)” (“What is
Suspicious Activity,” 2020). Despite this, people are more likely to report activity they
deem to be suspicious when the person involved is of a religious or ethnic minority
(Tipping, 2020). Nevertheless, racial complaints have been raised about MIAC numerous
times and there are calls to investigate the agency on racial discrimination complaints
(Mistler, 2020).
MIAC officials claim there would be less controversy surrounding their
operations if the public understood how the fusion center works. MIAC does not collect
any information on its own, nor does it conduct any investigations; all MIAC does is
compile information that is given to it through reports from the FBI’s “If You See
Something, Say Something” program and information that Law Enforcement Agencies
(LEAs) collect (“Maine Information and Analysis Center,” n.d.). This information is
analyzed and then kept on servers that are available for local police officers to search
through when they pull someone over or are on a scene with a person who they deem
suspicious. In addition to this, if MIAC gets a tip deemed to be “credible,” they will issue
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a bulletin on this person that can be seen by all agencies with access to the system
(“Maine Information and Analysis Center,” n.d.).
There have been many evaluations of fusion centers, their effectiveness, and
options for where the nations go with fusion centers. The Congressional Research Service
compiled a report for congress on the issues with fusion centers and the options that were
available to congress for how to move forward. This report found that mission creep going beyond terrorism and looking at more day-to-day crimes - is a problem for many
fusion centers across the country. Fusion centers are no longer focused on terrorism and
are now looking at more drug crimes and keeping track of people suspected of everyday
crimes (Masse, 2007). The report also found that the initial proposal from DHS had more
oversight intended for fusion centers including more strict requirements for information
gathering. However, once fusion centers were up and running this oversight did not occur
and fusion centers had more leeway than they were intended to (Masse, 2007).
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) also conducted an evaluation of
fusion centers and found that there are many issues with fusion centers. The main issue
that they found with fusion centers is that there are serious privacy issues with fusion
centers because they have a combination of new technology and governmental powers
that come with the war on terror. The analysis of the ACLU is that this results in
unprecedented possibilities of infringements on civil rights (German, 2007). Another
critique that the ACLU has is that fusion centers are not effective in preventing terrorism.
The ACLU argues that fusion centers have been funded and implemented without the
prerequisite research on if fusion centers are effective (German, 2007). The Senate
Governmental Affairs Committee’s Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations issued a
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report on fusion centers and evaluated that the effectiveness of fusion centers is low
compared to the amount of money that is put into them (Barnosky, 2015). A third
criticism that the ACLU found is that because fusion centers cross state, local and federal
lines, they have ambiguous lines of authority. This allows fusion centers to engage in a
practice of ‘policy shopping’ or looking for the regulation that fusion center leaders want
to follow and using that as their guide. They most often pick the regulation that allows for
the most amount of leeway (German, 2007).
1033 Program
The 1033 program, also known as the Law Enforcement Support Office (LESO),
was established in 1997 but increased its operations in 2002. The 1033 program is a part
of the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) under the Department of Defense (DOD) and is
one of the main ways that local police and the military are intertwined (“1033 Program
FAQs,” n.d.). The program was created in response to demands from local law
enforcement that they needed more weapons to combat terrorism. The purpose of this
program was to take decommissioned and surplus military equipment and transfer it to
local police departments in need of equipment and supplies. This program has provided
more than 8,000 LEAs with surplus and decommissioned military equipment since it
started (“1033 Program FAQs,” n.d.). In 2019, $293 million in property was transferred
to law enforcement agencies (“Law Enforcement Support Office,” n.d.).
There are currently 8,200 LEAs that participate in the 1033 program (“1033
Program FAQs,” n.d.). In order for agencies within a state to participate, the governor
must appoint a coordinator for the state. After states have joined the program, agencies in
the state can see the online inventory of items available to request. All requests from
9

agencies go through this coordinator before they go to the DLA. Requests must include
justification as to why the equipment is needed. Requests are approved by the state
coordinator as well as LESO personnel (“1033 Program FAQs,” n.d.).
Once a request has been approved, the equipment is packaged and shipped to the
local agency. LEAs do not pay for any of the equipment that they get from the 1033
program, but they do have to pay for shipping (“1033 Program FAQs,” n.d.). Once
departments receive equipment, training is supposed to be set up for their officers on the
proper use of the equipment and the situations in which it should be used; however, there
is no accountability to ensure that this training occurs. This creates a problematic opening
for officers to handle equipment without proper training or supervision (Musgrave,
2014).
The 1033 program has drawn three major criticisms in its history: (1) it is too easy
for the police to get military equipment, (2) there is not enough oversight of the program,
and (3) that police do not need this equipment. There have been many cases of
departments receiving equipment that was disproportionate to the amount of people that
they serve. For example, the Winthrop Harbor Police Department in Illinois, a town of
6,700 people, received 10 helicopters, a mine-resistant ambush protected vehicle
(MRAP), two Humvees, and more than 6.5 million dollars in other equipment. Police in
Johnston, Rhode Island, with a population less than 29,000, acquired two bomb disposal
robots, 10 tactical trucks, 35 assault rifles, more than 100 infrared gun sights. A Los
Angeles school district initially received three grenade launchers and more than 60 M16s; however, they returned the grenade launchers after public outcry in the city
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(Musgrave, 2014). All these distributions highlight the issues with the 1033 program and
the lack of accountability within the allocation process.
In order to show how easy it is for LEAs to get equipment and test the oversight
of the 1033 program, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) formed a fake LEA.
This fake LEA applied for and were sent 1.2 million dollars in military gear including
rifles and pipe bomb equipment. No one at the DLA did any research into this
department. A simple Google search would have shown that this was a fake department
(Hager, 2017). To add to this, some of this information only came to light because of a
lawsuit under the Freedom of Information Act. The DOD and LEAs did not want the
general public to know how over-armed they are or about the mistakes that were made
when handing out equipment (Musgrave, 2014).
Furthermore, there is no evidence that having more military equipment makes that
community safer. A 2020 meta-analysis by Gunderson and colleagues (2020) found that
there was no relationship between how much equipment a police department received
from the Federal Government and the crime rate in the area that the department patrolled
(2020). This suggests that police departments do not need the equipment that they have
received from the federal government and could mean that the 1033 program should be
terminated as it is ineffective at lowering the crime rate (Gunderson Et. Al, 2020).
The 1033 program is not the only way in which military equipment is transferred
to police departments. Certain pieces of equipment that LEAs cannot get from the 1033
program can be obtained through different types of property transfers or grants. Included
in this are military uniforms, body armor, Kevlar helmets, and any vehicle or plane that
has weaponry attached to it (i.e. tanks, armed drones, or fighting vehicles) (“1033
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Program FAQs,” n.d.). These transferal programs are less transparent than the 1033
program, so it is unknown how much or to where the equipment has been transferred.
Police departments in the state of Maine have received more than 13 million
dollars in equipment from the 1033 program since it was started. 79 police departments
received rifles. 7 police departments - Caribou Police Department, Cumberland County
Sheriff Department, Knox County Sheriff Department, Lewiston Police Department, Old
Orchard Beach Police Department, Sanford Police Department, and Scarborough Police
Department - received explosive ordnance disposal robots. Portland Police Department
and Cumberland County Sheriff department both received armored trucks, and
Cumberland County Sheriff Department and Sanford Police Department received mine
resistant vehicles. Wells police department also received two boats to perform water
patrols (Musgrave, 2014). Given all of the equipment that departments in Maine received,
it is important to understand what impact the officers using the equipment believe that it
has - which is what the current study seeks to do. Two-thirds of the departments from the
officers that I interviewed received equipment. One department only received rifles and
the other three departments received larger pieces of equipment.
Policing Studies
In the year following 9/11, the New York Police Department (NYPD) saw the
most drastic changes to their overall policing structure. Bornstein used both qualitative
and quantitative methods to examine the changes that NYPD officers experienced (2005).
On 9/11 officers who normally ran background checks, drove prisoner busses, or taught
at the academy were instead on the streets helping people and protecting the landmarks in
New York City. The NYPD also changed from eight hour shifts to 12 hour shifts in order
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to provide a greater show of force in the city. There was also a large display of highpowered machine guns across the city in an attempt to deter any further attacks
(Bornstein, 2005).
Broader quantitative studies have been done on the impact of 9/11 on policing in
the rest of the country. One example of this is “Measuring Homeland Security Innovation
in Small Municipal Agencies'' by Schafer and colleagues. This study looked at rural
policing in Illinois and relied on data collected as a part of the Illinois Homeland Security
Survey (2009). This study found that even though officials in rural departments rated
perceived threats of terror to be low, the majority of departments have been taking steps
to ensure that they are prepared for a terror attack. Some of these preparations have
included assigning liaisons to other agencies, training staff on terrorism preparedness,
and participating in terrorism-related field training exercises (Schafer, 2009).
The Council of State Governments also conducted a study to determine the impact
of terrorism on the functions of state police (Foster, 2005). They collected survey data
from the chiefs’ state and local police departments on their operational responsibilities,
the federal agencies that they interact with, and employment patterns. The study found
that more state police organizations (75%) thought that terrorism prevention was a part of
their operational responsibility than local agencies (60%) (Foster, 2005). Even with these
studies, there has never been a qualitative study that investigated individual officers’
opinions on their role in policing terrorism, national security, and other changes that may
have occurred since 9/11.
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CURRENT STUDY

This study seeks to fill the gap in the literature surrounding the effect of 9/11 and
national security policing on law enforcement in Maine. There has never been a study
done that focuses on policing in Maine. There has also never been a qualitative study
done in this area which could lead to new insights at the individual level. This study
seeks to fill this gap in the research by conducting semi-structured interviews with 10
police officers in Maine.
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METHODS

Participants
Table 1 Participants
Name

Age Education

Rank

Gender Region of Maine

Sam

49

Doctorate

Captain

Male

Southern Maine

Jake

50

Bachelors

Detective

Male

Southern Maine

Brian

43

Associates

Patrol Officer

Male

Southern Maine

Nate

54

Bachelors

Deputy Sheriff Male

Southern Maine

Conner 51

Doctorate

Chief

Male

Eastern Maine

Ryan

62

Bachelors

Deputy Chief

Male

Southern Maine

Sally

52

Bachelors

Detective

Female Southern Maine

Mike

50

Masters

Chief

Male

Southern Maine

Peter

58

High School Trooper

Male

Central Maine

Tony

42

Bachelors

Male

Southern Maine

Lieutenant

There were two inclusion criteria that all participants had to meet. All participants
must have been employed in Maine as a police officer before September 11, 2001 and be
currently employed as police officers in Maine. It was important that officers meet this
second criteria so they could experience the full range of changes that the policing
profession has experienced. The researcher contacted every police and sheriff's
department in Maine, as well as the Maine State Police, to recruit participants. Contact
information was found on publicly available police department websites. An email was
sent explaining the study and asking if there were any officers in the department who met
the criteria and were willing to volunteer. Some department chiefs declined to participate
15

on behalf of their officers because of department policies, while others passed on
information. Participants then contacted the researcher, and an interview was scheduled.
The ten participants came from six different police departments.
There are limitations to a small-N qualitative study. The main limitation is that the
findings generated from a small sample size cannot be generalized to a larger population
(Mahoney, 2000). This limitation applies to this study because of the small number of
participants and these results should not be extrapolated to other states or other police
officers within Maine.
The specific aim in this study was to examine how these officers in Maine thought
their jobs had changed since 9/11, as well as to understand the impact that these officers
thought 9/11 had on policing in Maine. One advantage to a small-n study is that all
interviews were heavily scrutinized, and the researcher was able to carefully examine
each interview transcript.
Interviews
The author conducted semi-structured interviews with the participants. Semistructured interviews start with a set of initial questions but allow deviation to go more in
depth when warranted (Regin, 2019). Seven interviews were conducted over Zoom or
Skype, one was conducted over the phone, and two were conducted over email.
Conducting any interviews face-to-face was impossible due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
The one phone interview was conducted because the participant was unable to figure out
either Zoom or Skype. The two email interviews were conducted due to the availability
of the participants and the researcher.
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Zoom, phone, and email interviews all have their advantages and disadvantages.
Because of the more limited ability to press participants over email, a preference was
given to phone and zoom interviews. In addition to this, neither phone nor email
interviews allow the researcher to watch the participants when they are answering
questions and pick up on subtleties such as body language and facial expressions. Email
interviews also do not allow the researcher to pick up on intonation of the voice, which
allows more insight into the thoughts and feelings of the participants (Archibald, 2019).
There is some evidence that phone interviews make the participant feel more comfortable
because the interviewer cannot see them, and they feel less judged (Block, 2012).
On average interviews took 25 minutes, with the longest interview lasting 50
minutes and the shortest lasting 20. The length of the interviews was on average rather
short; however, all the questions were very focused and valuable information was gained.
It would have been ideal for the interviews to last longer; however, many participants
gave short, direct answers and were not willing to elaborate when pressed. Even though
the interview time was short there were still many different views that were expressed,
and valuable information was learned.
Audio from the interviews was recorded and transcribed by the researcher. A set
of initial questions was used with every participant, including demographic information
(i.e., age, race, gender, rank, and marital status) and questions such as: What was being
an officer like before 9/11? Where were you on 9/11? Were there any immediate changes
to your job after 9/11? All the questions were focused on the topic of 9/11 and changes
1

that have taken place since that event. There was a mix of open-ended questions and yes
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or no questions. Participants were asked to elaborate on yes or no questions. Clarifying
questions were asked based on the answers of the participants.
Analysis
Transcripts were read three times in order to determine what the officers’ thought
was important in each interview and to obtain analytical ideas. This was done through
focused content coding. Focused content coding is a method for interpreting data where
the interview transcripts are read in depth several times and a code - a word or phrase that
captures what the participant was talking about - is assigned to each sentence (Saldana,
2008). In this study all the interviews were fully coded. These codes were then grouped
into categories based on similarities. The most prevalent categories became the themes
for this paper.
In this study there was only one coder. Because of the inexperience of the coder,
the first three coded interviews were reviewed by an experienced researcher to ensure
that the process was being done properly. After this, all interviews were coded by one
coder. Reliability in qualitative research can be achieved by scrutinizing themes and
features in the data multiple times, and by constantly shifting between the data and
literature (Silverman, 2009). This was done throughout the coding process. In addition to
this, the findings were compared with extant literature throughout the coding process to
ensure reliability.
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RESULTS
Each participant was asked to reflect on how their jobs changed after 9/11. While
each participants’ experience was unique, the data analysis revealed three themes present
across the interviews: (1) the extent to which local and state officers were involved in
policing national security; (2) the changing of the function of local police; and (3) the
emphasis placed on intelligence collection and fusion centers.
National Security
After 9/11 many people in the federal government became obsessed with ensuring
that an attack on that scale never happened again. DHS was created in an effort to
achieve this goal and many people within the FBI were resigned to work on countering
terrorism in the aftermath of 9/11. This extended to the state and local level, and
programs were created to facilitate the passage of information between different levels of
policing.
Participants had different views on the significance of national security in their
day-to-day jobs. Some officers were convinced that they were helping with national
security, while others were adamant that the national law enforcement agencies did not
want them involved. The majority of the participants were somewhere in the middle.
Peter, an officer in the commercial traffic enforcement department, believed his
unit played a significant role in protecting national security. Peter has worked in law
enforcement since 1990 and has worked with the same department for his entire career,
though he has had different positions within the department. When talking about national
security, Peter stated:
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… I don't think that the type of heightened threat comes into play every
day, we don't see that as much, but it is still in the back of your mind like
what is going on. You're always keyed into it. Is this truck hauling
something or is this driver doing something they shouldn't do - is
something wrong? So, it is there, but the country has kind of relaxed from
that aspect of the terrorist attack thing. Until you come across a driver that
is on the terrorist watch list, or maybe on the watchlist - then that
heightened sense of security comes back (October 1, 2020).
Peter stated that he had come across a driver on the terrorist watch list a few times and
that he had followed procedure by reporting it, but never knew what came of his actions.
He was upset by this lack of follow-up from the Federal Government. Peter was the only
officer that I interviewed who unequivocally thought that their job was now more
oriented towards national security. This might be because of the unique position that this
officer held: commercial traffic enforcement. Peter spends his days inspecting trucks and
making sure that truckers in the state are following all the laws. Because of this, this
officer interacts with many drivers daily. This officer stated that national security was in
the back of his mind until he encountered a driver on the terrorist watch list, which was
established as a result of 9/11.
Three officers felt that their jobs had some levels of national security involvement
but not to the extent that Peter did. Ryan, who had been promoted several times since
9/11, from a patrol officer in Southern Maine to the deputy chief of a different
department in the same area, felt that he was only more aware of it because of his change
in position:
No, [we do not focus more on national security] except that in the position
that I am in now I see the big picture a little bit more and I see how maybe
something seemingly maybe inconsequential in a small municipal
department may actually be a part of something bigger and contribute to
some national security issue (September 30, 2020).
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Ryan described being more aware of the bigger picture and acknowledged how
events that occur in his town could relate to larger events and could threaten
national security. For example, how some of the 9/11 hijackers passed through the
Portland jetport. A detective in Ryan’s department, Jake, had a slightly different
view. He said:
I don’t know if I would say that we have more of a focus on [national
security] but we are certainly more aware of it. I’ll use an example. Every
year... we have an event called the Christmas prelude. It is probably the
biggest event that we prepare for, in the year. Six, eight, ten thousand
people come in for this Christmas-time event. [After 9/11] we are more
aware about large gatherings, a lot more goes into the planning of it. We
think you know we are in this small downtown area, ...what if there was,
you know somebody came down the middle of the street with a truck and
started mowing people over. How do we react to that, how do we plan for
that? ...We are more aware. Everyone learned to be more aware from 9/11.
(September 9, 2020).
Jake identified soft targets (places that are not protected by the military, relatively easy to
get to, and create fear for everyday citizens that they could also become targets) as
something that they think about more since 9/11 as well as being more aware that there
could be a threat against civilians. The twin towers were hit because the destruction of
them was designed to make Americans scared in their everyday lives. He also discussed
terrorism preparedness for soft targets and crowded placed, something that was
unimaginable before that day.
Unlike Peter, Ryan, and Jake above, the next two officers thought that their jobs
had nothing to do with national security. When asked if he thought that he was more
involved with national security Mike, a chief of a Southern Maine department responded
with simply “No. not at all” (this interview was done over email and the officer did not
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respond when asked to clarify in a follow-up), while Nate, Deputy Sheriff from a
Southern Maine county stated:
No. The federal government made it abundantly clear that local police
departments were not to deal with national security. That was for federal
law enforcement agencies to deal with. Local law enforcement agencies
were not smart enough to deal with national security and there was a
concerted effort to make sure that we were not involved, except in
increasing security at strategically sensitive areas. That attitude continues
to this day (September 16, 2020).
The statement that these officers gave are completely false. The FBI and DHS rely on
local police departments to give them tips on what is going on in their areas and
countering violent extremism. It is possible that both Nate and Mike have had negative
experiences with the federal government and that is why they have these opinions.
Overall, there was no consensus from the officers that I spoke to about whether or
not their jobs were more oriented towards national security. One officer said that they
definitely thought more about national security and actively participated in the process,
two said that it did not at all, and the other seven fell somewhere in between.
Local police changing
Since 9/11, there have been large changes to local policing in large cities such as
New York City and Los Angeles. In policing atmospheres such as this, there have been
task forces with the FBI established, officers deployed to prominent places with highpowered weapons, and specialized counter terrorism units. There have not been changes
to this extent in less populated areas; however, it is possible that there have been other
changes in these less populated areas that are more subtle.
There was not a unanimous opinion from this study about if and how local
policing had changed since 9/11. Some officers saw changes in their day-to-day work,
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others felt that there were only changes in certain situations, and other officers said they
saw no changes at all.
Sam, a captain from a Southern Maine department, who has worked in law
enforcement since 1998, cited many changes that he had experienced:
We are recording more. We are trying to connect the dots more often. And
I think that as opposed to just going to a call, taking a complaint about
something, and writing a report, it is interconnected. … We connect the
data to other agencies. So, prior to going to a call, I am learning about
what prior calls we have been on with this person, what have other towns
responded to this person. We have a lot more data available to us as to the
person that we are responding to (September 3, 2020).
This is one of the few examples of an officer who thought that 9/11 had changed the way
that their job looked on a daily basis. Sam gave an example of intelligence-led policing,
the concept that police officers responding to calls for service know the history of
interactions that this person has had with the police. This new technique has changed the
ways that police operate on a day-to-day basis.
Ryan, a deputy chief from a different Southern Maine department had a slightly
different belief. When talking about how his job has changed since 9/11, he stated:
I don't know that it has changed appreciably except with more of an
emphasis on situational awareness, being more alert to things that are
around you. Such as things like infrastructure, you know, people paying
undue attention to things that are potential, would be potential terror
targets, things like that. As far as the day-to-day job goes, I don't think that
it has changed a great deal at all. At least here in a municipal police
department. (September 30, 2020).
This was one of the most popular opinions stated: that the day-to-day job had not
changed at all, but the greater goals of policing had morphed into stopping terrorism and
monitoring potential targets.
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I had expected this to break down along lines of rank, with officers in leadership
positions (such as chiefs and deputy chiefs) thinking that their jobs had changed and were
more oriented towards national security because these officers are in charge of looking at
the big picture. I also expected that patrol officers and other officers on the streets from
day to day would think that there was not a great deal of change. This expectation was
true in some cases; however, not in all like that of Mike, a chief from southern Maine
who stated:
I’m sure that for agencies with large populations … 9/11 had a necessary
effect. Intelligence gathering in order to keep communities safe and stop
threats took on a new urgency. For the vast majority of American police
departments, 9/11 had little to no effect on our policing (October 19,
2020).
Mike drew direct comparisons between small-town and local policing and the
type of policing that takes place in large cities. However, he also states that he did
not see any change in the type of policing that his department does.
Overall, there was no consensus that local policing was impacted by 9/11. There
was a wide variety of opinions on whether local policing had changed or not. Two
officers felt that their jobs were different on a day-to-day basis, while four others felt that
the use of technology had changed the way that they interacted with the public. Four
other officers expressed that there were changes, but that they were minor and did not
actively affect their day-to-day jobs.
Fusion Centers
Fusion centers are information databases that operate at the state level, in
conjunction with DHS and the FBI. Each fusion center collects, keeps and disseminates
information between federal, state, local, and county law enforcement agencies. The
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fusion center in Maine is called the Maine Information and Analysis Center (MIAC).
MIAC was established in 2006.
One finding that was consistent between the majority of the participants was that
there was a new emphasis on intelligence collecting and information sharing. One officer
from a Southern Maine police department was able to give this new emphasis a name; “I
think we are more into intelligence-based policing and I think that is where the shift in
policing has really occurred. I wouldn’t call it terrorism based so much as intelligencebased.” Intelligence-based policing (also known as intelligence-led policing) is the idea
that the police officers responding to calls for service know the record of the person
involved and have more information before they arrive. This has been one of the biggest
changes in policing that has come out of 9/11 (Gonzales, 2005). Two officers that were
interviewed directly named intelligence-based policing and three others talked about it
indirectly.
One of the officers who talked indirectly about intelligence-based policing was
Jake, an officer from another department in Southern Maine. He said:
I would say the biggest change has been information gathering and
sharing. Before you know a lot of people were kind of territorial over
information that they had. So, let’s say that Maine State police were
working on a case involving a guy that might be a threat or have terrorist
ties or something like that, they would do their investigation and gather
information, but they wouldn't necessarily share that with anybody. They
were possessive of the information - we developed this information we are
running with it and there is no need to share it. Since 9/11 one of the
biggest changes, probably the biggest change, is the Fusion center
(September 9, 2020).
When asked to give an example of personal use of a fusion center, this officer
stated:
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So, let’s say, like last summer we had some concerns about a guy that was
in [place redacted] in [town redacted], he had some Middle Eastern ties
and had created a scene over there. Well, we wanted to know is this guy
just exercising his first amendment rights or this something that we should
be really concerned about. Probably the first call would be to the fusion
center to share that information, to get any information that they might
have on the guy. So, it's a lot more sharing a lot better working
relationships between agencies (September 9, 2020).
This officer essentially described how the process of using a fusion center in a real-life
policing situation. Fusion centers have greatly expanded the information that police have
access to while they are working. This allows police to be better prepared.
When Conner, a chief from a department in Eastern Maine, was asked if his job
had changed since 9/11, he said:
I would say no. There was larger talk about interoperability and
communication. That seemed to be the first change that came out. There
was not a great system in place for that before … Not as much [change] as
I think we should have had. I think we have improved with the move, sort
of going towards digital. and, but I don't know that we have done a great
job, not inter-agency, but um … different disciplines - such as public
works - and agencies that are not normal emergency response entities. I
don't know that we have done a great job bringing them into the fold so
that we have better communications with those groups as well during a
large-scale event (September 18, 2020).
This officer saw some changes in communication but felt that there was still room for
improvement. In a different part of his interview, this officer also talked about the role
that fusion centers play and the communication improvements that had occurred between
his department and the intelligence sectors of the federal government. He also talked
about the FBI’s ‘see something, say something’ program and the reliance that police have
on the general public for tips and information about suspicious people.
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Peter, an officer who worked in a commercial traffic enforcement department was
able to point to a concrete example of how the communication in his job had changed
since 9/11:
The FBI started the joint terrorism task force with Homeland Security, and
they created a database of everybody driving a commercial vehicle within
the US and there were certain people who could get licensing for certain
things - like they were screening any drivers who were taking any like
hazardous shipment any kind of dangerous things (October 1, 2020).
All officers involved in commercial vehicle enforcement have access to this database and
can consult it whenever they find a suspicious driver. Like fusion centers, this is a
development in the goal of achieving national security.
The majority of the participants agreed that communication had changed greatly
since 9/11, particularly with the federal government and the establishment of MIAC,
Maine’s fusion center. The establishment of fusion centers has been one of the biggest
national changes since 9/11.
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DISCUSSION
The FBI does not keep an official public list of domestic terrorist organizations,
so it is impossible to know how many terrorist organizations are active in Maine
(Bjelopera, 2017). There are lists compiled and made available by private entities. The
Southern Poverty Law Center has published a list of anti-government movements in
Maine. These include: The American Patriots Three Percent, a statewide organization.
The Constitution Party, Maine Militia, Maine Volunteer Responders, Three Percenters,
and We Are Change are all localized to specific towns or countries (“Anti Government
Movements,” n.d.). These groups are all active in the state and have the potential to pose
a threat to the public and the government (“Anti Government Movements,” n.d.).
The FBI has labeled “lone-wolf” attacks, (also known as leaderless jihad) or a
person being radicalized and deciding to commit terrorism on their own, as a higher-level
threat than attacks directed by a terrorist organization (Jenkins, 2011). This is because
directed attacks are easier to detect as they are often accompanied by communications
that can be monitored. There were a few years in the early 2010’s where the FBI was
concerned that the rising population of Somali immigrants in Portland and Lewiston
could have radicalized members and pose a risk for a domestic terrorist attack. After
multiple investigations and years of monitoring activities, the FBI determined that there
was little risk for radicalization among the Somali communities in Lewiston and Portland
(Fisher, 2014). Based on this, it is likely that a terrorist attack in Maine would either
come from a White Supremacist or from a person who does not live in the state (Fisher,
2014; Jenkins, 2011).

28

Key Findings
The results from this study can be broken down into three categories: national
security, local police changing, and fusion centers. One notable finding is the lack of
consensus among participants regarding two themes: national security and local police
changing.
National Security
First, there was no agreement between the officers on whether 9/11 led to
increased attention to national security. The officers who stated they thought that the
federal government told local police that they should not be involved with national
security matters were factually incorrect. There have been some federal programs that
have attempted to engage local police in the national security process, including the
Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Initiative (NSI), also known as the “If
You See Something, Say Something” program. This program invites local law
enforcement to investigate tips reported by the public for credibility of terrorism. If there
is a possibility of terrorism, the tip should be passed along to the FBI; however, the FBI
cannot investigate all possible terrorists across the United States, so they rely on local law
enforcement to investigate initial reports. This brings local law enforcement into the
terrorism sphere (“What is Suspicious Activity,” 2020).
There has also been an emphasis by the federal government on critical
infrastructure protection at the local level (such as communications, energy, food and
agriculture, government facilities, transportation, and nuclear materials) (“Critical
Infrastructure Sectors,” n.d.). Local police are also instrumental in this goal as there is a
great deal of critical infrastructure to protect and federal law enforcement cannot be
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everywhere at once. Local police have become the front line in protecting their local
critical infrastructure and their local community from terrorism. Some of the officers
interviewed claimed that they were not involved with national security (Davis, 2010).
The lack of consensus on national security among the officers that I interviewed
was interesting. Four officers were able to cite specific programs and ways that they were
involved in preventing terrorism. This finding suggests that some local police are aware
that federal law enforcement need their help. However, two officers were adamant that
the federal government did not want their help with terrorism prevention. It is possible
that these officers have had a negative encounter with attempting to help federal law
enforcement and have been put off by this experience. It is also possible that these
officers were simply unaware of the programs that they were supposed to be participating
in; however, this is unlikely as one of the officers was a deputy police chief.
This lack of consensus could mean a few things. It is possible that officers are not
connecting some of their daily tasks that act as terrorism prevention to national security
policing. Simple activities such as patrolling areas with critical infrastructure may not
seem like terrorism prevention to an officer. It could also mean that police officers do not
know why they are doing what they have been told to do and are simply following orders,
like the example of patrolling critical infrastructure.
Local Police Changing
In addition to national security, there was also a lack of consensus about if and
how local policing in general had changed. There were no patterns based on rank,
department, town or country population size, or region of Maine that could be identified
as to who thought their job had changed. Peter, a trooper, and Conner, a police chief, both
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said that they felt their jobs had more to do with national security. Mike, a police chief,
and Sally, a detective, both said that they thought that their jobs had nothing to do with
national security.
This difference in job perception is important because the role of police should be
clearly defined and understood by all officers. It is estimated that police officers only
spend about 5-15% of their time on crime fighting activities (Robinson, 2018). The rest
of the time is spent on administrative tasks, responding to non-emergent calls for service,
and providing general public service. Very little time is spent responding to emergencies.
Terror prevention and critical infrastructure monitoring usually fall into the category of
patrol or when responding to non-emergent calls for service. It is possible that these
officers have been told to patrol certain areas but have not been told why or what to look
for (Aradau, 2020).
Two officers talked about making connections between departments and more
collaboration taking place with other parts of the government. These changes have been
documented. There is more interoperability between departments and more
communication in general (Kwon, 2009). There are databases that police officers have
access to at all points in time that contain information on a person's past run-ins with law
enforcement. Officers use this information when they are responding to non-emergent
calls for service (“National Network of Fusion Center Fact Sheet,” n.d.).
It is unclear why some officers were so adamant that there had been no change in
their jobs. After the first few interviews, I thought that the change in local policing might
be related to rank. Meaning that police chiefs and other officers higher up in the chain of
command would have seen more change because they think about the bigger picture

31

more often and patrol officers would have seen a minimal difference because they are
more focused on day-to-day activities and the minutiae of policing. This was not the case
as there was no correlation between any demographic and the perception of local police
changing.
Fusion Centers
The only finding that was generally consistent between the majority of the
participants was the communication differences between pre-9/11 policing and post-9/11
policing. The one communication innovation that 7 out of the 10 participants talked about
was the creation of fusion centers. All the officers that mentioned fusion centers stated
that they are advantageous to law enforcement. Three officers stated that they had made a
report to MIAC and two stated that they had been given information about a suspicious
person from MIAC.
MIAC is an information hub that receives, analyzes, and shares information. All
police officers in the state have access to the information. Information is typically
submitted to MIAC through email by officers. Anytime that an officer submits
information to MIAC it is analyzed with all the information that MIAC already has.
MIAC also analyzes the information for terrorism credibility and if there is anything
actionable it is passed to the FBI or the DHS. MIAC is not an investigative agency, they
only provide support and analysis to officers (“Maine Information and Analysis Center,”
n.d.).
Communication, and MIAC in particular, being the only common change that all
the officers spoke about, is a noteworthy finding because fusion centers are one of the
most highly scrutinized innovations in policing since 9/11. There has been a great deal of
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controversy surrounding MIAC, including having personal data hacked and leaked,
mission creep, and accusations of civil rights violations. The “Blueleaks” hack exposed
the personal information of thousands of people that MIAC had records on (Rhoda,
2020).
In addition to this, MIAC has expanded past its original conception of fighting
terror and into the area of the drug war and monitoring protestors who pose no threat to
national security (Byrne, 2020). MIAC has also been accused of being racist because they
collected information on people involved with Black Lives Matter protests and not people
involved in right wing extremist groups, as well as holding more information on people
who are part of ethnic and racial minorities in general. (Tipping, 2020). MIAC officials
claim that they only have more information on minorities because they receive more
reports about people who are part of minorities through the FBI’s “If You See
Something, Say Something” program (Byrne, 2020).
Recommendations
One recommendation that has come out of this research is clearly defining the
role of local police officers in Maine. The officers that I interviewed have vastly different
interpretations of the jobs that they should be doing. Some thought that their job was
strictly local and had no effect on national security. Other officers understood the role
that the federal government was asking them to fill. Police officers should have a role that
is clearly defined and includes terrorism prevention and critical infrastructure protection.
Another recommendation is the reform of MIAC. Police officers have repeatedly
stated that MIAC is an important law enforcement tool. They claim that it has helped
them to keep track of would-be terrorists and disrupt possible terror attacks. However,
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there have also been many issues with MIAC. There was a successful hack that resulted
in thousands of people's personal information being exposed (Byrne, 2020). In addition to
this MIAC has exhibited extensive mission creep that has resulted in civil rights
violations (German, 2007). There have been many people who have called for the
abolishment of MIAC because of these reasons, including the Maine State Legislature.
There is currently a bill pending that would defund MIAC because of the results of the
Senate report on fusion centers that found they are not effective and because of the civil
rights violations uncovered by the ACLU (German, 2007; Barnosky, 2015).
Because of this dichotomy, the mission of MIAC should be more clearly defined
and limited. The Maine State Legislature should pass legislation limiting the scope of
MIAC to strictly terrorism - the original intent of the organization. The legislation should
also focus on ensuring the civil rights of the people of Maine. However, the bill currently
in the legislature goes too far. MIAC does serve a purpose in the terrorism sphere and if it
were contained to this purpose would be a valuable asset.
Limitations and Future Research
One limitation of this study was the small number of participants. The response
rate was much lower than anticipated. Many officers did not want to participate due to the
political climate during which the study took place. In addition to this, 11 departments
declined to participate altogether because of department policies. The goal of a minimum
of 15 interviews was set at the beginning of the study. This goal was not reached and only
10 interviews were conducted.
A second limitation was the demographics of the police officers that were
interviewed. All the officers were White and nine out ten officers were male. It is unclear
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to what extent the demographics of the officers influenced their view of policing in
Maine, but to better understand how policing has changed, a set of officers with a wider
set of demographic characteristics should be interviewed. Maine does not collect
demographic data about police officers in the state, so it is unclear how skewed this
sample is from the population. Maine as a whole is 94.4% White so the sample
demographics are similar to the state as a whole (U.S. Census Bureau, 2019).
In addition to this, there was a lack of geographic diversity among the
participants. The majority of the officers interviewed were from the southern region of
the state. There was a significant shortage in all other areas. This is significant because
the Lewiston area has a high population of Somali immigrants and the officers in this
area may have vastly different opinions than the officers that were interviewed. There
was also a lack of officers from areas near the border with Canada. These officers may
feel that they have more of an impact on national security because of their geographic
location and the border security actions that they may or may not take.
A third limitation is that the officers interviewed only focused on the impact of
Salafism (or Islamic extremism). The officers did not discuss terrorism from White
Supremacists or any other form of terrorism when talking about their collaborations with
the federal government. Some officers mentioned incidents of terror attacks by White
Supremacists, such as the Columbine shooting; however, this was only in passing and as
an explanation for the evolution of weapons that local police carry.
It is possible that the framing of the questions caused this narrow definition of
terrorism to be used, as most of the questions were centered around the 9/11 terrorist
attacks. If a replication study were to be conducted, there should be broader questions
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that allow officers an opportunity to speak about the threat of terrorism from any groups
including white supremacy groups.
More studies with higher sample sizes and similar methods could be done to
better understand what officers think the impact of 9/11 has been for law enforcement in
the state. Studies with more participants would be able to assess a broader range of
opinions and get a more in depth understanding of policing in the state. This method
could also be expanded nationally to understand the differences in regional local policing.
A study of this nature would be valuable because policing is highly localized.
Future research would benefit from a less politically charged time. Hopefully, this
would result in more officers talking to a researcher the officers might be more candid
with their responses. In addition to this a larger sample would be very valuable, ensuring
that there would be officers from the Lewiston area. It would be interesting to hear what
these officers' thoughts are on these topics because the Lewiston area has a high
population of Somali immigrants. It would also be beneficial to conduct some participant
observation to see how local police officers in Maine actually use fusion centers and how
many actions they take to protect the national security of the country. In addition to this,
interviews with people who participate in the NSI process at all levels would be valuable.
This would include the officers who investigate the reports, the people who work in
fusion centers, and FBI agents who investigate the reports that are determined to be
credible for terrorism.
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CONCLUSION
There has never been a study that focuses on how police in Maine think their jobs
have changed since 9/11. Overall, there was a lack of consensus among the officers that I
interviewed on their experiences as local police officers before and after 9/11. There was
no agreement on if local policing had changed or if national security now makes up a
larger part of local policing. The only aspect of policing that the majority of police that I
interviewed agreed on was that there was more emphasis placed on communication
between local police departments and national security agencies since 9/11 and that
fusion centers aided in this. This study was relatively small, and the results cannot be
generalized to the rest of police officers in Maine or the rest of the country. More studies
would have to be done in order to understand this phenomenon on a broader scale.

37

REFERENCES
Anti Government Movement (n.d.). Southern Poverty Law Center.
https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/ideology/antigovernment
Archibald, M. (2019). Using Zoom Video Conferencing for Qualitative Data Collection:
Perceptions and Experiences of Researchers and Participants. International
Journal of Qualitative Methods. https://doi.org/10.1177/1609406919874596
Aradau, C. (2010). Security that matters: critical infrastructure and objects of protection.
Security Dialogue. 41(5) pp. 491–514.
Barnosky, J. (2015, March 17). Fusion Centers: What’s working and what isn’t.
Brookings.
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2015/03/17/fusion-centers-whatsworking-and-what-isnt/
Bjelopera, J. (2017, August 21). Domestic Terrorism: An Overview. Congressional
Research Service.
https://www.americanvoiceforfreedom.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/09/domesticterrorism.pdf
Block, E. S., & Erskine, L. (2012). Interviewing by Telephone: Specific Considerations,
Opportunities, and Challenges. International Journal of Qualitative Methods,
428–445. https://doi.org/10.1177/160940691201100409
Bornstein, A. (2005) “Antiterrorist Policing in New York City after 9/11: Comparing
Perspectives on a Complex Process.” Human Organization. vol. 64, pp. 52–61.
http://dx.doi.org.prxy4.ursus.maine.edu/10.17730/humo.64.1.mf00296tl98bk2l5.
Byrne, M. (2020, May 14). Maine trooper says he was retaliated against for reporting
illegal police surveillance of citizens. Portland Press Herald.
https://www.pressherald.com/2020/05/14/maine-trooper-says-he-was-retaliatedagainst-for-reporting-illegal-police-surveillance-of-citizens/#
Critical Infrastructure Sectors. (n.d.). Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency.
https://www.cisa.gov/critical-infrastructure-sectors

38

Davis Et. Al. (2010, December). Long-Term Effects of Law Enforcement’s Post-9/11
Focus on Counterterrorism and Homeland Security.
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/232791.pdf
Fisher, L. (2014). Islamic Radicalization in the State of Maine. International Institute for
Counter-Terrorism. https://www.ict.org.il/UserFiles/IRI%20in%20Maine.pdf
Foster, C. (2005). The Impact of Terrorism on State Law Enforcement. Council of State
Governments.
https://www.csg.org/knowledgecenter/docs/Misc0504Terrorism.pdf
German, M. (2007). What’s Wrong with Fusion Centers. American Civil Liberties
Union.
Gonzales, A. (2005, September). Intelligence-Led Policing: The New Intelligence
Architecture. Department of Justice
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/210681.pdf
Gunderson, A. (2020, December 7). Counter Evidence of crime-reduction effects from
federal grants of military equipment to local police. Nature Human Behavior. 5.
194-204. https://www.nature.com/articles/s41562-020-00995-5
Hager, E. (2017, July 21). How Fake Cops Got $1.2 Million in Real Weapons. The
Marshall Project.
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2017/07/21/how-fake-cops-got-1-2-millionin-real-weapons
Jenkins, B. (2011). Radicalization and Recruitment to Jihadist Terrorism in the United
States Since 9/11. Rand Corporation.
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2011/RAND_OP
343.pdf
Kwon, G. (2009). Redefining Interoperability: Understanding Police Communication
Task Environments. Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.
LeCates, R. (2018, October 17). Intelligence-led Policing: Changing the Face of Crime
Prevention.
https://www.policechiefmagazine.org/changing-the-face-crimeprevention/#:~:text=Intelligence%2Dled%20policing%20gathers%20domestic,cri
me%20or%20group%20of%20crimes.
39

Mahoney, J. (2000). Strategies of Causal Inference in Small-N Analysis. Sociological
Methods & Research. 28(4), 387-424.
https://journals-sagepub-com.wv-o-ursusproxy02.ursus.maine.edu/doi/10.1177/0049124100028004001
Maine Information and Analysis Center. (n.d).
https://www.maine.gov/dps/msp/specialty-units/MIAC
Masse, T. (2007, July 6). Fusion Centers: Issues and Options for Congress. CRS Report
for Congress
McQuade, B. (2019, August). Pacifying the Homeland: Intelligence Fusion and Mass
Supervision. University of California Press.
Mistler, S. (2020, June 24). Maine Lawmakers Probe Racial Profiling, Privacy Concerns
Raised About Information Gathering Agency.
https://www.mainepublic.org/post/maine-lawmakers-probe-racial-profilingprivacy-concerns-raised-about-information-gathering
Musgrave, S. (2014, December 04). The Pentagon Finally Details its Weapons-for-Cops
Giveaway.
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2014/12/03/the-pentagon-finally-details-itsweapons-for-cops-giveaway
National Network of Fusion Center Fact Sheet. (n.d.). Department of Homeland
Security.
https://www.dhs.gov/national-network-fusion-centers-factsheet#:~:text=%22A%20fusion%20center%20is%20a,to%20criminal%20and%20
terrorist%20activity.%22
Price, M. (2013). National Security and Local Police. Brennan Center for Justice.
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/201908/Report_NationalSecurity_LocalPolice.pdf
Regin, C,. & Amoroso, L. (2019). Constructing Social Research. (Third ed) [E-book].
Sage Publications.

40

Rhoda, E. (2020, July 1). Mainers with data exposed in crime center’s breach have little
recourse. Bangor Daily News.
https://bangordailynews.com/2020/07/01/mainefocus/mainers-with-data-exposedin-crime-centers-breach-have-little-recourse/
Robinson, M. (2018). Media coverage of crime and criminal justice. Carolina Academic
Press. Saldana, J. (2021). The Coding Manual for Qualitative Researchers. Sage
Publications.
See What Your Local Agency Received from the Department of Defense.
https://www.themarshallproject.org/mp-graphics/201412-dod/embed.html
Schafer, A. (2009). Measuring Homeland Security Innovation in Small Municipal
Agencies: Policing in a Post–9/11 World. Police Quarterly. 12 (3). 263-288.
https://journals-sagepub-com.wv-o-ursusproxy02.ursus.maine.edu/doi/pdf/10.1177/1098611109339891
Silverman, D. (2009). Doing qualitative research (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks: SAGE.
Tipping, M. (2020, June 26). Data breach exposes activities of Maine’s secretive police
intelligence agency. Maine Beacon.
https://mainebeacon.com/data-breach-exposes-activities-of-maines-secretivepolice-intelligence-agency/
U.S. Census Bureau. (2019). Maine Quick Facts.
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/dashboard/ME/PST045219
What is Suspicious Activity? (2020, September 16). Department of Homeland Security.
https://www.dhs.gov/see-something-say-something/what-suspicious-activity
1033 Program FAQs. (n.d.). Defense Logistics Agency.
https://www.dla.mil/DispositionServices/Offers/Reutilization/LawEnforcement/Pr
ogramFAQs.aspx

41

APPENDICES

42

APPENDIX A: LIST OF INITIAL QUESTIONS
Demographics-related questions
Name, rank, department
Rank and department on 9/11
Year became an officer
Age
Salary
Education history
Marital status
Gender/Sex
Questions pertaining to 9/11
What was being an officer like before 9/11
Where were you on 9/11
Were there any immediate changes to your job after 9/11
Have these changes been permanent
Do you feel like your job is now more oriented towards national security
Have these changes affected the way that you interact with the public
How has your job changed since 9/11?
Questions if the officer’s department has received equipment from the defense
department
What equipment did your department receive
Do you think that this equipment has had an impact on the way that you do your job
What is this equipment used for
How has having this equipment impacted the community
How do you feel about having this type of equipment? Has it enhanced your effectiveness
as a police officer?
Concluding questions
After having these experiences, what advice would you give to someone who has just
become a police officer?
Is there something that you might not have thought about before that occurred to you
during this interview?
Is there something else you think I should know to understand the effect of 9/11 on
policing?
Is there anything you would like to ask me?
Is there anyone you think I should speak to?
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SUBJECTS
Protection of Human Subjects Review Board, 400 Corbett Hall
PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR: Andrew King EMAIL:
andrew.king2@maine.edu FACULTY SPONSOR: Karyn Sporer EMAIL:
karyn.sporer@maine.edu (Required if PI is a student):
TITLE OF PROJECT: Police Officers' View of the Militarization of
Police in Maine START DATE: August 1, 2020 PI DEPARTMENT:
Sociology
STATUS OF PI:
FACULTY/STAFF/GRADUATE/UNDERGRADUATE U
(F,S,G,U)
If PI is a student, is this research to be performed:
# for an honors thesis/senior thesis/capstone?
"
Submitting the application indicates the principal investigator’s
agreement to abide by the responsibilities outlined in Section I.E. of the
Policies and Procedures for the Protection of Human Subjects.
Faculty Sponsors are responsible for oversight of research conducted by their students.
The Faculty Sponsor ensures that he/she has read the application and that the conduct of
such research will be in accordance with the University of Maine’s Policies and
Procedures for the Protection of Human Subjects of Research. REMINDER: if the
principal investigator is an undergraduate student, the Faculty Sponsor MUST submit the
application to the IRB.
Email this cover page and complete application to UMRIC@maine.edu
**********************************************************************
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